What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us
About the Federal Constitution
Joseph Blocher*
INTRODUCTION
Courts and scholars have long sought to illuminate the relationship
between state and federal constitutional law. Yet their attention, like the
relationship itself, has largely been one-sided: State courts have
consistently adopted federal constitutional law as their own, and scholars
have attempted to illuminate why this is, and why it should or should not
be so. By contrast, federal courts tend not to look to state constitutional
law, even for persuasive authority. Nor have scholars argued at any
length that federal courts can or should look to state constitutional law
for guidance in answering the many constitutional questions common to
the federal and state systems.
This short Article attempts to turn the focus around, by asking what
state constitutional law can tell us about the federal constitution. The
thesis explored here is that federal constitutional doctrine can and
sometimes should do more to draw on state constitutional law,
particularly when that law addresses—as it often does—analogous
language or problems with which the federal courts have little
experience. The Article calls this idea “reverse incorporation” for lack of
a better phrase, but “federal constitutional borrowing of state
constitutional law” would probably be more accurate, if a bit clunkier. In
any event, the phrase is not meant to invoke the “reverse” incorporation
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associated with Bolling v. Sharpe,1 but to denote a wide range of “uses”:
from looking to state doctrine as persuasive authority in federal cases to
using it to define federal law.
Elsewhere, I have described this thesis in depth, considered some of
the arguments for and against it, and sketched out some tentative
normative claims about when and how federal constitutional law should
draw more from state constitutional law.2 This short piece presents an
abbreviated version of the major arguments for and against such
borrowing. It then goes on to address how reverse incorporation, like
any interpretive tool, must be tailored to one’s preferred constitutional
theory and to the particular constitutional issue presented. An originalist
and a pragmatist will have very different uses for state constitutional law,
for example, and will use it differently in Eighth Amendment cases than
in Due Process cases. After identifying some of the concerns relevant to
that kind of theory—and issue-tailoring, the Article concludes by
addressing some general questions about the normative vision behind
reverse incorporation.
I.

REVERSE INCORPORATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Federal and state constitutions are interrelated in their history, text,
traditions, and doctrine. State-level rights guarantees served as the
model for many of the most familiar features of the Bill of Rights and of
American constitutional law.3 As Justice Brennan noted, “Prior to the
adoption of the federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually
recognized in the federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in
one or more state constitutions.”4 But for a variety of reasons, arguably
including the decline of state identity and inarguably including the rise of

1. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In that case, the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment—whose language refers only to the states—applies to the federal
government, a conclusion sometimes referred to as reverse incorporation. I use “reverse”
to capture the fact that the approach I describe encourages the application of state
constitutional law in federal doctrine. This is in some sense the “reverse” of the usual
constitutional incorporation, which applies federal doctrine against the states. Id. at 500.
2. See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011).
3. See Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 989, 989 (1996) (“State charters are the foundation of American Constitutional
law.”); see generally Gordon S. Wood, Foreword, State Constitution-Making in the
American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 911 (1993) (discussing the role of state
constitutions in establishing “the primary conceptions of America’s political and
constitutional culture”).
4. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501 (1977).
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incorporation doctrine,5 federal constitutional law eventually took center
stage. Because federal rights guarantees came to bind the states in
almost all particulars, and because the Warren Court interpreted those
guarantees so broadly, the states’ own constitutional guarantees became
essentially superfluous.6 Constitutional litigation focused on federal
rights, and state constitutional doctrine withered.
The perceived retraction of federal rights guarantees—particularly
those of criminal defendants—under the Burger Court inspired
something of a state constitutional law renaissance, or at least inspired
calls for one. Often referred to as the “New Judicial Federalism,” this
revitalization of state constitutional law was closely associated with
Justice Brennan’s 1977 Harvard Law Review article, which called on
state courts to interpret broadly their states’ constitutional guarantees.7
The idea, of course, was that state constitutional doctrine—once
sidelined by the Warren Court’s expansive jurisprudence—might exceed
the federal floor and guarantee rights left unprotected by the Supreme
Court.
Despite Brennan’s entreaties, many if not most state courts
continued to apply federal constitutional law as if it where their own.
This approach, long lamented by many scholars of state constitutional
law (not to mention state judges), is known as “lockstepping,”8 and
remains perhaps the most common mode of state constitutional
decisiomaking.9 Of course, the fact that state courts tend to adopt federal
doctrine does not mean that they are obligated to do so. Indeed,
Brennan’s invitation remains open: State courts are free to interpret their
state constitutional rights guarantees more broadly (or less, though not to

5. See David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 274, 280 (1992) (arguing that incorporation doctrine “resulted from the
unwillingness of many state courts, particularly in the South, to use their own
constitutions to protect their citizens from state overreaching”).
6. James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, Foreword, The New Frontier of State
Constitutional Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (2005) (noting that after the
Warren Court’s expansive reading of individual rights, “state constitutional law was seen,
not illogically, as in some fundamental way subordinate to national constitutional law”).
7. Brennan, supra note 4; Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate
Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983) (describing
Brennan’s article as the “Magna Carta of state constitutional law”).
8. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 102 (2000) (“Under the lockstep approach, the
state constitutional analysis begins and ends with consideration of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the textual provision at issue.”).
9. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as
an Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1850 (2004)
(“Despite . . . criticism, the lockstep approach remains the most common approach to
state constitutionalism.”).
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any effect)10 than the federal courts do analogous federal guarantees.
And yet in practice state courts essentially treat federal constitutional law
as if it were, if not binding, at least a strong form of persuasive authority.
There is, however, no reason why federal courts could not engage in
the same kind of borrowing when, for example, they confront
constitutional issues on which state constitutional law is well-developed
and federal constitutional law is not. After all, federal constitutional law
is no more (or less) bound by state constitutional law than state
constitutional law is bound by federal law.11 Federal judges are therefore
just as free as their state counterparts to use the other’s law as guidance,
and occasionally issues arise for which the states have a relatively
uniform and well-developed jurisprudence on a question with which the
federal courts have little or no experience. The standard of review
applicable to the “individual” right to bear arms is a timely example:
Every state court to reach the question has employed a “reasonableness”
standard for evaluating gun control laws,12 and yet the Supreme Court in
Heller13 and McDonald14 apparently declined to adopt such a test.15
But pointing out an asymmetry is not the same as making a
convincing case for its correction, and so it is important to consider some
of the arguments for and against federal borrowing of state constitutional
law. I have explored these issues in more depth elsewhere,16 but a short
summary is perhaps appropriate, beginning with the arguments in favor.
First, increased use of state constitutional law may help vindicate
our constitutional commitment to federalism. States are often said to be
“laboratories” whose experimentation with law and policy should be
encouraged,17 and federal borrowing of state constitutional law provides

10. Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1123, 1127 (1992) (“[N]othing in federal constitutional law prevents state courts
from interpreting state law more narrowly than federal, despite the fact that they are
barred [by the Supremacy Clause] from enforcing the less-protective state law.”).
11. The Supremacy Clause may render state constitutional law irrelevant where it
conflicts with federal law, but that does not necessarily mean that state courts must
interpret state constitutional law so as to avoid such conflict.
12. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683,
686-87 (2007).
13. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
14. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010).
15. It is not entirely clear whether the McDonald plurality rejected the
reasonableness test or simply declined to adopt it. Elsewhere, it approvingly cited a brief
filed by thirty-eight state attorneys general arguing that “[s]tate and local experimentation
with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second Amendment.” Id. at
3046.
16. See Blocher, supra note 2, at Part II.
17. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
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a relatively straightforward way for federal courts to learn from those lab
experiments. If the state courts say that the exclusionary rule is the only
way to prevent police misconduct, for example, then federal courts might
be well served to follow the same path when developing Fourth
Amendment doctrine.18 Moreover, on a more theoretical level, if
federalism is supposed to divide or share power between the political
branches of the state and federal governments, why not do the same with
interpretive power within the judiciary?
Second, state constitutional law can serve as a relatively “objective”
measure of current constitutional values. Of course, contemporary
constitutional values are not relevant to all interpretive theories, nor to all
legal issues. But they are often thought to be important when it comes to
questions like what punishments are “cruel and unusual” and therefore
violate the Eighth Amendment,19 or what rights are “fundamental” to a
scheme of ordered liberty and thus incorporated against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.20
A
widespread and generally uniform state constitutional practice can be
useful evidence in that regard. If state constitutions unanimously
prohibit a certain punishment, for example, then it may be more
confidently said that the punishment is “cruel and unusual” for the
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.21 To the contrary, if the practice is
widely accepted, that may be evidence of its constitutionality.22
Third, borrowing of state constitutional law would appear to be a
near-ideal kind of comparative constitutional law—a mode of
interpretation that attempts to derive lessons from the similarities and

courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
18. James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1039 (2003)
(noting that when it applied the exclusionary rule against the states, “the Court was
deeply influenced by an emerging consensus among state courts, which it carefully and
extensively documented, that suppression of illegally seized evidence was the most
effective way to deter constitutionally unreasonable searches”).
19. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
20. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
21. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (finding that execution of juveniles
violates the Eighth Amendment based in part on the fact that thirty states and the federal
government do not do so); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-14 (2002) (similar
analysis and conclusion for mentally retarded offenders). This attention to state practice
is in many ways a natural outgrowth of the modern Eighth Amendment doctrine, which
the Court has said “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 311-12; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 56061.
22. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion) (rejecting Eighth
Amendment challenge to method of execution based in part on the fact that thirty six
states and the federal government employ that method).
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differences among legal systems.23
Comparativism is obviously
extremely controversial, but even those wary of the practice regularly say
that it is less troubling, and may even be acceptable, where the
comparator legal system is either based on or similar to our own.24 In
that sense, states are a perfect target for comparative analysis. They have
much of the same constitutional language, similar traditions, and are in
fact part of the very same constitutional system as the federal
constitution.25 Indeed, this particular argument in favor of borrowing
may become stronger the more one doubts that states have any
meaningful, independent identity.
But of course none of these arguments (nor any other) is necessarily
a stand-alone winner, and depending on one’s theory of interpretation or
the constitutional question at issue, they may not have any cachet at all.
And thus it is also important to describe and address some of the
arguments against federal borrowing of state constitutional law.26 The
following discussion reviews three of the strongest.
First, there seems to be a general feeling that state constitutional law
is not “good” enough to shape federal constitutional doctrine. This
impression may partially be a comment on the perceived quality of state
constitutions or the judges who interpret them, but there are also
structural reasons that may be relevant. One could say, for example, that
the easy amendability of state constitutions and the election of state
judges makes state constitutional law too malleable and politically
sensitive to represent the kind of “timeless” constitutional values we
associate with the federal constitution.27 After all, it is not hard to find
examples of state judges losing their seats after handing down
23. See generally David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49
UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001) (surveying the practice of comparative constitutionalism and
suggesting a model for its proper use); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999) (similar).
24. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks,
in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN
SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (“Now that
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United
States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their
own deliberative process.”).
25. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts,
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 359 (“[T]he differences between the relevant state constitutions
and the federal constitution are much smaller than the differences involved in the
transnational comparisons that are a staple of comparative constitutional law.”).
26. See Blocher, supra note 2, Part II.B.
27. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
265, 287-88 (2008). As Pozen notes elsewhere, judicial elections at the state level might
nonetheless serve a useful role as instruments of popular constitutionalism. See generally
David Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047
(2010).
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constitutional rulings protecting politically unpopular groups or rights.28
Just this past year, the Iowa judges who held that their state constitution
protected a right to same-sex marriage were punished at the polls.29 This
may be troubling, as it suggests that judges might under-protect minority
rights in order to stay on the bench. And yet in some areas of federal
constitutional law, and for some interpretive theories, a degree of
responsiveness may be a strength, such as when it comes to measuring
beliefs about what constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment or what
rights are “fundamental.”
Second, it may well be that federal borrowing of state constitutional
law is impossible because state constitutions are simply too different—
either from the federal document or from each other—for comparativism
to be useful. There are, of course, significant differences between state
and federal constitutions. And yet there are also significant areas of
overlap in terms of intent, structure, tradition, and text, particularly when
it comes to the kinds of individual rights guarantees captured in the
federal Bill of Rights.30 Those similarities, after all, are what makes
lockstepping possible (even if undesirable) at the state level. Moreover,
state constitutions have enough in common with each other to enable the
kind of inter-state borrowing chronicled by many scholars of state
constitutional law.31
Finally, there are arguments against borrowing state constitutional
law that derive not from the nature of state constitutional law, but from
the nature of federal constitutional interpretation. If one believes that the
federal constitution should be interpreted in line with the intents,
understandings, or expected applications of the Founders, for example,
state constitutional doctrine might seem to be irrelevant at best and
distorting at worst. This objection is not easy to answer in general terms.
Indeed, it demonstrates that reverse incorporation can be used as an
interpretive tool in many different ways, depending on the constitutional
issue before a court and on the court’s own theory of interpretation. The

28. See generally John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California
Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70
JUDICATURE 348 (1987) (describing successful campaign to unseat Rose Bird and
colleagues on the California Supreme Court).
29. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2010, at A1.
30. See, e.g., Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative,
63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1985) (noting that the federal Framers “derived much of
their inspiration from guarantees provided by the colonies that became the original
states”).
31. See generally Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 835 (1997); Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A
Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 179-80 (1985).
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following Part attempts to push the argument forward by addressing
some of those concerns.
II.

WHEN AND HOW MUCH TO BORROW

The reverse incorporation described here is an interpretive tool, not
an interpretive theory. As such, it does not provide complete or clear-cut
answers to constitutional questions, nor is it self-justifying. In order to
fully determine whether and how state constitutional law can usefully be
imported into federal constitutional doctrine, one must have a thicker
notion of what constitutional interpretation should be and what it should
hope to achieve. A complete constitutional theory is far beyond the
scope of this or any Article, but Section II.A advances some general
observations that may be relevant for determining when and how the tool
of reverse incorporation can be used consistently with various
constitutional theories. It is similarly impossible to say whether or how
this tool would be useful in each and every type of constitutional case,
but Section II.B suggests some possible considerations.
A.

Tailoring to Theory

Constitutional theory can shape the usefulness of reverse
incorporation at two points: First, in determining whether to borrow
state constitutional law; and second, in determining how much weight
should be given to that law. That is, one must ask first whether and
when an interpretive theory permits borrowing of state constitutional
law, and—if it does—then ask how it employs that which is borrowed.
The answers to these questions need not necessarily track each other.
One can, for example, give an enthusiastically affirmative answer to the
first question by saying that borrowing of state constitutional law is
widely permissible, while hedging on the second question by saying that
it is useful only as persuasive authority, or vice versa.
The ways in which one answers those two questions—the
permissibility and importance of reverse incorporation—will almost
certainly depend on one’s preferred method of constitutional
interpretation. An originalist, for example, might reject the broad use of
contemporary state constitutional law on the grounds that it does not
relate to the Founding-era intent or understanding of the people who
wrote and ratified the federal constitution—the usual tools of originalist
interpretation.32 And yet even the most committed originalist will
32. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851-52
(1989) (explaining that the “‘originalist’ approach to constitutional interpretation”
includes “examining various evidence, including not only, of course, the text of the
Constitution and its overall structure, but also the contemporaneous understanding”).

2011]

WHAT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CAN TELL US

1043

presumably look with interest to the Founding-era state constitutional
law that informed, and may help illuminate, the meaning of the federal
document.33 Justice Scalia did precisely this in his self-consciously
originalist opinion in Heller.34 Indeed, many of the most recognizable
features of American constitutionalism (including judicial review)35 were
first found in state constitutional law. To the degree that this is so, state
constitutional law may prove to be an especially strong—and perhaps
determinative—tool of originalist federal constitutional interpretation. In
other words, it may be narrowly but highly relevant.
Similarly, textualism, which is often originalism’s fellow traveler,36
focuses on the meaning of the words in the federal constitution as being
the primary (or arguably sole) relevant piece of interpretive information.
For much the same reason as it should be relevant to originalists, state
constitutional law should be of assistance to textualists, for the simple
reason that state constitutions have language that is in many instances
identical to that of the federal constitution.37 Indeed, they served as its
model.38 So if one seeks insight into the meaning of the words in the
latter, the language of the former can presumably be extremely
illuminating.
Another major set of constitutional theories may be grouped
together (again, very roughly) under the heading “living
constitutionalism.”
Like originalism and textualism, living
constitutionalism comes in many forms. One major strain focuses on
what might be called the “moral evolution” of society—the degree to
which our shared moral commitments and beliefs have changed since the
Framing, and how those changes can or should be effectuated in
constitutional doctrine.
For adherents to this approach, state
constitutional law should be an especially useful barometer, since it is
33. Id. at 852 (noting that originalist analysis also includes examination of “the
various state constitutions in existence when the federal Constitution was adopted”).
34. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6, 583 n.7, 584-88,
590 n.13, 591-93, 599-606, 612-15, 628-30 (2008).
35. H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note, 53
ALB. L. REV. 283, 294 (1989) (“Only the eclipse of state constitutional law has led to
Marbury’s enthronement as the case that ‘established’ judicial review.”).
36. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731,
731 (2010) (“[O]riginalism-driven textualism has assumed an increasingly prominent role
in constitutional interpretation, at least within the academy.”).
37. Gardner, supra note 18, at 1029 (“[T]he texts of the state constitutions are, at
many critical points, similar or even identical to one another and to parallel provisions of
the U.S. Constitution.”).
38. Brennan, supra note 4, at 501 (arguing that state court decisions in the 1960s and
1970s “put[] to rest the notion that state constitutional provisions were adopted to mirror
the federal Bill of Rights. The lesson of history is otherwise; indeed, the drafters of the
federal Bill of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in the various state
constitutions.”).
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ultimately more malleable (responsive to changing moral commitments,
that is) than the federal constitution. Changing interpretations of what
punishments are permissible, for example, can be solid “objective”
evidence of society’s moral commitments.39 Another major strain of
living constitutionalism is distinctly pragmatic in nature. It focuses less
on moral commitments and more on the social impact of constitutional
rules. Justice Breyer is often said to display such a pragmatic approach,
frequently reciting and deferring to legislative fact-finding and policy
decisions.40 For pragmatists, state constitutional law may be useful
inasmuch as it demonstrates the results of the states’ service as
“laboratories of experimentation.” For example, in considering whether
to incorporate the exclusionary rule against the states, the Court in Mapp
looked to the experience of California, which had concluded as a matter
of state constitutional law that the exclusionary rule was the only
practical way to deter police misconduct.41
Of course, this broad and shallow overview does not begin to give
sufficient attention to the interpretive theories it mentions, much less the
many theories it does not. But the point is not to rework the Article’s
thesis repeatedly for all approaches to constitutional interpretation—or
the uncountable permutations thereof—but rather to show that, like any
interpretive tool, the usefulness of reverse incorporation will vary
according to one’s preferred theory. That may not make it any more
universal than any other interpretive tool, but neither is it any less so.
B.

Tailoring to Questions

There is another variable likely to impact the usefulness of state
constitutional law as an interpretive tool—the nature of the constitutional
case at issue. As with interpretive theories, different types of
constitutional cases may call for different uses of state constitutional law,
and may impact both the breadth and the strength of reliance on state
constitutional law. And as with interpretive theories, the breadth and
strength of use need not necessarily track one another.
39. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (relying on current state
law as “objective indicia” of “evolving standards of decency”); Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (same).
40. See Jack Wade Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist
Constitutional Reform in the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 171,
266 n.390 (2002) (noting “Justice Breyer’s tendency to defer to Congress as a co-equal
branch of government and his deference to government more generally”).
41. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (citing People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905,
911 (Cal. 1955)). See also Gardner, supra note 1818, at 1039 (“[T]he Court was deeply
influenced by an emerging consensus among state courts, which it carefully and
extensively documented, that suppression of illegally seized evidence was the most
effective way to deter constitutionally unreasonable searches.”).
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One could, for example, say that state constitutional law is broadly
relevant, but only as persuasive authority. Such a broad-but-shallow
approach may be useful, for example, in cases where state constitutional
law is used to evaluate the possible practical impact of a constitutional
rule. Fourteenth Amendment cases considering the scope of the
exclusionary rule may be exemplary, since the concerns involved in
those cases are often the kinds of pragmatic considerations for which
persuasive authority may be especially helpful. In other situations, one
might say that state constitutional law is only relevant in narrow
circumstances, but that in those circumstances it effectively defines the
federal rule, rather than just serving as persuasive authority. This might
be true when it comes to defining what punishments are “cruel and
unusual,” or what rights are “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and
traditions.”42
There is, of course, another large set of constitutional issues not yet
addressed: those involving “structural” constitutional questions.43 If, as I
have suggested, state and federal rights guarantees can be treated as
analogues, why not do the same with state and federal rules regarding
separation of powers or other structural matters? The possibility of
structural comparitivism with regard to structural provisions is intriguing
and potentially fruitful, but I hold it aside here for a few reasons.
Although there are undoubtedly many structural questions common to
the state and federal systems—whether the executive is or should be
“unitary,” for example44—structural provisions appear to vary more than
rights guarantees. State free speech guarantees are often identical to the
text of the First Amendment,45 but few states have constitutional
language akin to the Commerce Clause.46 This textual variance reflects a
fundamental difference in the powers of states and the federal
government. The federal government, of course, may act only where the
federal constitution gives it power to do so. States, by contrast, have the
42. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
43. Many thanks to Josh Chafetz for encouraging me to think through these
structural comparisons.
44. For one notable contribution on this point, see William P. Marshall, Break Up
the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided
Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006).
45. Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a
Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125 at 165-82 (1969) (comparing state bills of rights
provisions to guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights and finding substantial similarities).
See also id. at 138 (“Every state provides for the protection of some or all of the rights
usually referred to as First Amendment rights. All states, with varying degrees of
generality or specificity, guarantee the free exercise of religion and freedom of the
press.”).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States”).
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general police power and can act anywhere they are not specifically
prohibited. As a result, “State constitutions are documents of limits,
while the federal constitution is a document of grant.”47 Structural
provisions in the federal constitution therefore play a fundamentally
different role than those in state constitutions. The federal constitution’s
structural provisions are primarily concerned with enumerating powers
and with dividing it not only among the branches of the federal
government but between the federal government and the states. To the
extent that these concerns exist at the state level, they are not as strong.
In any event, because the importance of state constitutional law as
an interpretive tool varies across theories and across cases, it is
impossible to give a single answer to the question of how often it should
be used and what weight it should receive. What counts as a strength for
one interpretive theory or type of case will be a weakness for another.
One might object that state constitutional law cannot be much of an
interpretive tool if it is impossible to say precisely when and how much it
is useful. But the versatility of the tool is not a good enough reason to
reject it outright, any more than the other tools in the constitutional
workshop that are more useful for some jobs than others. International
comparativism, for example, is controversial and may not be appropriate
in every case, but it cannot be rejected out of hand solely because it is
difficult to say when it should be used and when it should not.
Intranational comparativism should not be held to a higher standard.
The more pointed version of the objection accepts this counterargument, and uses it as the basis for another: Reverse incorporation
simply gives judges yet another manipulable tool with which to write
their own preferences into law. This question—how to constrain the
discretion of unelected, unaccountable federal judges—goes to the heart
of interpretive theory and the countermajoritarian difficulty, and pithy
answers are impossible. And yet there is no discernible reason to suspect
that state constitutional law will be any more subject to manipulation or
disagreement than the many other interpretive tools the federal courts
already employ: legislative history, text, and history itself. Reverse
incorporation of state constitutional law is by no means a perfect tool,
but it is at least as useful as those that already clutter the Court’s
workshop.
III. GENERAL QUESTIONS
The previous Part attempted to address some of the theory—and
issue-specific questions—complicate any effort to give a general account
47. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L.
REV. 271, 277 (1998).
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of reverse incorporation. But there are also a few over-arching
complications with the approach. This final Part identifies and attempts
to address a particularly important one: In an approach that purports to
be focused on state constitutional law, what exactly are the roles of
states, and of constitutions?
This Article has referred—as all of us do—to “state constitutional
law,” as if it were always clear what counts as such. But of course,
defining state constitutional law is not necessarily any easier than
defining federal constitutional law. State constitutional law could refer
to the documents themselves, to the gloss given by state courts, or to
something else entirely. In order to talk meaningfully about borrowing
that law, shouldn’t we first define what it is?
Yes and no. Certainly, it would be useful if state constitutional law
were capable of an easy definition. Otherwise it is entirely possible that
federal courts attempting to borrow it might simply disagree about what
it is they should be borrowing. This could in turn lead to complicated
problems if, for example, federal judges disagree about whether “state
constitutional law” is represented by a state constitution’s guarantee that
“The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” or
instead by that state’s supreme court’s holding that the right is subject to
reasonable regulation. One might want to avoid the problem by saying
that state courts are the final authority on the meaning of their
constitutions, but this is not a complete answer, if federal courts are only
looking for persuasive authority. The text of a state constitution may
seem more “persuasive” to a federal judge than the state court’s
interpretation of that text. If so, the federal court may end up borrowing
a state constitutional doctrine that even the state’s own courts do not
endorse.
And yet the inevitable difficulty of defining state constitutional law
should not be any more disabling for reverse incorporation than for
federal constitutional law as a whole. The fact that both are hard to
define does not make it impossible to study or utilize them. We teach
federal constitutional law, after all, despite deep intellectual rifts over
such fundamental questions as whether the beliefs of “the people” do or
should have any role in defining our constitutional tradition.48 It seems
no more troubling to speak of state constitutional law in comparably
general terms.
48. One well-known iteration of this over-arching debate concerns “popular
constitutionalism.” The literature is too vast and varied to summarize, but LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004) is undoubtedly part of the canon, as is the criticism of Kramer’s work found in
Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1594 (2005).
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But even if we can hold aside the question of what counts as
constitutional, another question arises: What does it matter? Many of
the supposed benefits of reverse incorporation described above—
accounting for popular will and measuring practical experience, for
example—do not seem to depend on the “constitutional” nature of the
borrowed law. What does one get from analyzing state constitutions that
one does not get from, for example, analyzing state laws or taking public
opinion polls? If there is nothing particularly relevant about state
constitutions qua constitutions, isn’t the approach described here really
one about “the constitution outside the constitution”?49
This, too, is a difficult question that does not yield an easy answer.
The instinctive move is to say that constitutions are “different” from
other forms of law, but that is simply a way of re-stating the question, not
resolving it. Establishing why and how they are different, or should be
treated as such, requires a thicker account of constitutional law than I can
muster here. Suffice to say, the benefits of borrowing described here are
not necessarily attuned to whatever it is that makes a constitution a
constitution. Inasmuch as state constitutional law is a useful tool for
borrowing because of the persuasiveness of its reasoning, for example, it
is not clear that it should carry any more weight than, say, the weight of
academic opinion.
And yet the instinctive reaction—that constitutional law is
different—seems to be right. Whatever one’s approach to federal
constitutional interpretation, it surely does matter that state constitutional
law is “constitutional.” Like federal constitutional law, it is an
entrenched statement of a community’s constitutional values, one that—
though easier to alter than the federal version—is both a statement of
principle and an enforceable provision of basic law. Whether this
differentiates state constitutional law much from other forms of state law
is a valid question, the answer to which will surely vary state by state.
But surely it is not too much to say (at least to the audience of this
symposium) that state constitutional law is somehow special.
Reverse incorporation is not out of the woods yet. For just as one
can question the role of constitutions qua constitutions, one might also
question the role of states qua states.50 If cities called their laws
“constitutions” and treated them as such, would they be entitled to the
same kind of respect as state constitutions? Or, to illustrate the issue
from a different angle: Are different states entitled to the same “weight,”

49. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J.
408 (2007).
50. Many thanks to Aziz Rana and Michael Dorf for raising these federalism
questions.
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or does California’s constitutional law matter more than Wyoming’s
because seventy times as many people live in California? If the states
are not counted equally, it would seem that they are not being treated as
valuable as states, but rather as something else—proxies for public
opinion, perhaps.
This is a difficult question to answer in the abstract, because the
answer depends on the answers to the questions described above—in
other words, on how one is using state constitutional law. In some cases,
it must be true that state identity is not particularly important in the
approach described here. If, for example, one uses state constitutional
law simply as an indicator of contemporary constitutional values, then it
might be true that state identity itself is not particularly important. One
could just as easily count local-level regulations, or perhaps even public
opinion polls. But one can also measure public opinion by counting
states. That obviously will not necessarily capture what the majority of
the public thinks, given the differences in population across states. But it
would not be any less democratic than, say, the United States Senate.
On the other hand, if one is using state constitutional law only as
persuasive authority, then it might very well be appropriate to count
California’s law for more than Wyoming’s or vice versa, perhaps
because one state’s constitution or judges are “better” than the other’s.51
The same could be said of issue-tailoring. If, for example, federal courts
are facing some kind of federal constitutional issue with which some
states have more expertise than others—a takings question that involves
mineral rights, for example, or the treatment of an ethnic minority whose
population is concentrated in a few states—then it may make perfect
sense to count some states’ constitutional law more than others.
This short defense of the importance of states is not meant to be
comprehensive, but merely to show that reverse incorporation is not
necessarily antagonistic—nor even agnostic—to federalism. But neither
is it possible to offer a general account of the importance of states and
constitutions, because it will vary according to all of the metrics
described above. That may be somewhat disappointing, but it is a
shortcoming common to nearly all interpretive tools. Few, if any, offer a
general theory of their own relevance. The method of reverse
incorporation described here is not alone in facing these complications.
CONCLUSION
This Article and the one on which it builds have attempted to
suggest a relatively simple idea: Federal courts should, at least

51.

Let me emphasize that I have no reason to believe that this is true.
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occasionally, use state constitutional law at least as persuasive authority,
and perhaps even as something more. Perhaps wrongly, I regard this as a
relatively weak suggestion, since it does not seem like much to ask that
the state courts’ decisions—which are accorded respect in many other
ways, such as through jurisdictional rules that protect them from federal
review52—be given some persuasive weight. But I recognize that even
this idea is not neutral as to interpretive methodology. That is to say,
one’s view of constitutional interpretation is likely to color one’s view of
the relevance of state constitutional law, as is the nature of the
constitutional issue being addressed. So I have attempted in these
remarks to go a little further in describing the strengths and weaknesses
of my thesis through the lens of some of the leading theories of
constitutional interpretation. I have also attempted to address some of
the major potential objections and underlying problems with this
proposal. Fully resolving them is a task that will require far more work.

52. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 449-500 (1941) (holding
that in most cases federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of a state law
until state courts have had a reasonable opportunity to do so); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 49-53 (1971) (requiring, with limited exceptions, federal courts to abstain from
hearing civil rights tort claims arising from criminal prosecution until after conviction);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943) (allowing federal abstention when
state courts have greater expertise in the matter); Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976) (allowing abstention in cases of
parallel litigation).

